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Abstract
Regret minimization has played a key role in online learning, equilibrium com-
putation in games, and reinforcement learning (RL). In this paper, we describe a
general model-free RL method for no-regret learning based on repeated reconsid-
eration of past behavior. We propose a model-free RL algorithm, the Advantage
Regret-Matching Actor-Critic (ARMAC): rather than saving past state-action data,
ARMAC saves a buffer of past policies, replaying through them to reconstruct
hindsight assessments of past behavior. These retrospective value estimates are
used to predict conditional advantages which, combined with regret matching,
produces a new policy. In particular, ARMAC learns from sampled trajectories
in a centralized training setting, without requiring the application of importance
sampling commonly used in Monte Carlo counterfactual regret (CFR) minimiza-
tion; hence, it does not suffer from excessive variance in large environments. In the
single-agent setting, ARMAC shows an interesting form of exploration by keeping
past policies intact. In the multiagent setting, ARMAC in self-play approaches
Nash equilibria on some partially-observable zero-sum benchmarks. We provide ex-
ploitability estimates in the significantly larger game of betting-abstracted no-limit
Texas Hold’em.
1 Introduction
The notion of regret is a key concept in the design of many decision-making algorithms. Regret
minimization drives most bandit algorithms, is often used as a metric for performance of reinforcement
learning (RL) algorithms, and for learning in games [3]. When used in algorithm design, the common
application is to accumulate values and/or regrets and derive new policies based on these accumulated
values. One particular approach, counterfactual regret (CFR) minimization [39], has been the core
algorithm behind super-human play in Computer Poker research [4, 29, 6, 8].
We investigate the problem of generalizing these regret minimization algorithms over large state
spaces in the sequential setting using end-to-end function approximators, such as deep networks.
There have been several approaches that try to predict the regret, or otherwise, simulate the regret
minimization: Regression CFR (RCFR) [38], advantage regret minimization [20], regret-based policy
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gradients [34], Deep Counterfactual Regret minimization [5], and Double Neural CFR [26]. All of
these approaches have focused either on the multiagent or single-agent problem exclusively, some
have used expert features, while others tree search to scale. Another common approach is based
on fictitious play [18, 19, 25, 28], a simple iterative self-play algorithm based on best response. A
common technique among several of these algorithms is to use reservoir sampling to maintain a
buffer that represents a uniform sample over past data, which is used to train a classifier representing
the average policy. In Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP), this produced competitive policies in
limit Texas Hold’em [19], and in Deep CFR this method was shown to approach an approximate
equilibrium in a large subgame of Hold’em poker. A generalization of fictitious play, policy-space
response oracles (PSRO) [25], stores past policies and a meta-distribution over them, replaying
policies against other policies, incrementally adding new best responses to the set, which can be seen
as a population-based learning approach where the individuals are the policies and the distribution is
modified based on fitness. This approach only requires simulation of the policies and aggregating
data; as a result, it was able to scale to a very large real-time strategy game [37]. In this paper,
we describe an approximate form of CFR in a training regime that we call retrospective policy
improvement. Similar to PSRO, our method stores past policies. However, it does not store meta-
distributions or reward tables, nor do the policies have to be approximate best responses, which can
be costly to compute or learn. Instead, the policies are snapshots of those used in the past, which
are retrospectively replayed to predict a conditional advantage, which used in a regret matching
algorithm produces the same policy as CFR would do. In the single-agent setting, ARMAC is related
to POLITEX [1], except that it is based on regret-matching [17] and it predicts average quantities
rather than explicitly summing over all the experts to obtain the policy. In the multiagent setting, it is
a sample-based, model-free variant of RCFR with one important property: it uses trajectory samples
to estimate quantities without requiring importance sampling as in standard Monte Carlo CFR [24],
hence it does not suffer from excessive variance in large environments. This is achieved by using
critics (value estimates) of past policies that are trained off-policy using standard policy evaluation
techniques. In particular, we introduce a novel training regime that estimates a conditional advantage
Wi(s, a), which is the cumulative counterfactual regret Ri(s, a), scaled by factor B(s) that depends
on the information state s only; hence, using regret-matching over this quantity yields the policy
that CFR would compute when applying regret-matching to the same (unscaled) regret values. By
doing this entirely from sampled trajectories, the algorithm is model-free and can be done using any
black-box simulator of the environment; hence, ARMAC inherits the scaling potential of PSRO
without requiring a best-response training regime, driven instead by regret minimization.
2 Background
In this section, we describe the necessary terminology. Since we want to include the (partially-
observable) multiagent case and we build on algorithms from regret minimization we use extensive-
form games notations [33]. A single-player game represents the single-agent case where histories are
aggregated appropriately based on the Markov property.
A game is a tuple (N ,A,S,H,Z, u, τ), where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players. By con-
vention we use i ∈ N to refer to a player, and −i for the other players (N − {i}). There is a
special player c called chance (or nature) that plays with a fixed stochastic strategy (chance’s fixed
strategy determines the transition function). A is a finite set of actions. Every game starts in an initial
state, and players sequentially take actions leading to histories of actions h ∈ H. Terminal histories,
z ∈ Z ⊂ H, are those which end the episode. The utility function ui(z) denotes the player i′s return
over episode z. The set of states S is a partition ofH where histories are grouped into information
states s = {h, h′, . . .} such that the player to play at s, τ(s), cannot distinguish among the possible
histories (world states) due to private information only known by other players 1. Let ∆(X) represent
all distributions over X: each player’s (agent’s) goal is to learn a policy pii : Si → ∆(A), where
Si = {s | s ∈ S, τ(s) = i}. For some state s, we denote A(s) ⊆ A as the legal actions at state s,
and all valid state policies pi(s) assign probability 0 to illegal actions a 6∈ A(s).
Let pi denote a joint policy. Define the state-value vpi,i(s) as the expected (undiscounted) re-
turn for player i given that state s is reached and all players follow pi. Let qpi,i be defined
similarly except also conditioned on player τ(s) taking action a at s. Formally, vpi,i(s) =
1Information state is the belief about the world that a given player can infer based on her limited observations
and may correspond to many possible histories (world states)
2
∑
(h,z)∈Z(s) η
pi(h|s)ηpi(h, z)ui(z), where Z(s) are all terminal histories paired with their prefixes
that pass through s, ηpi(h|s) = ηpi(h)ηpi(s) , where ηpi(s) =
∑
h′∈s η
pi(h′), and ηpi(h, z) is the product
of probabilities of each action taken by the players’ policies along h to z. The state-action values
qpi,i(s, a) are defined analogously. Standard value-based RL algorithms estimate these quantities
for policy evaluation. Regret minimization in zero-sum games uses a different notion of value, the
counterfactual value: vcpi,i(s) =
∑
(h,z)∈Z(s) η
pi
−i(h)η
pi(h, z)ui(z), where ηpi−i(h) is the product
of opponents’ policy probabilities along h. We also write ηpii (h) the product of player i’s own
probabilities along h. Under the standard assumption of perfect recall, we have that for any h, h′ ∈ s,
ηpii (h) = η
pi
i (h
′). Thus counterfactual values are formally related to the standard values [34]:
vpi,i(s) =
vcpi,i(s)
β−i(pi,s)
, where β−i(pi, s) =
∑
h∈s η
pi
−i(h). Also, q
c
pi,i(s, a) is defined similarly except
over histories (ha, z) ∈ Z(s), where ha is history h concatenated with action a.
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a tabular policy iteration algorithm that has been at the
core of the advances in Poker AI [39]. On each iteration t, CFR computes counterfactual values
qcpi,i(s, a) and v
c
pi,i(s) for each state s and action a ∈ A(s) and the regret of not choosing action
a (or equivalently the advantage of choosing action a) at state s, rt(s, a) = qcpit,i(s, a) − vcpit,i(s).
CFR tracks the cumulative regrets for each state and action, RT (s, a) =
∑T
t=1 r
t(s, a). Define
(x)+ = max(0, x); regret-matching then updates the policy of each action a ∈ A(s) as follows [17]:
piT+1(s, a) = NORMALIZEDRELU(RT , s, a) =
{
RT,+(s,a)∑
b∈A(s) RT,+(s,b)
if
∑
b∈A(s)R
T,+(s, b) > 0
1
|A(s)| otherwise
,
(1)
In two-player zero-sum games, the mixture policy p¯iT converges to the set of Nash equilibria as
T →∞.
Traditional (off-policy) Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR) is a generic family of sampling variants [24]. In
outcome sampling MCCFR, a behavior policy µi is used by player i, while players −i use pi−i, a
trajectory ρ ∼ (µi, pi−i) is sampled, and the sampled counterfactual value is computed:
q˜cpi,i(s, a | ρ) =
1
η
(µi,pi−i)
i (z)
η
(µi,pi−i)
i (ha, z)ui(z), (2)
if (s, a) ∈ ρ, or 0 otherwise. q˜cpi,i(s, a | ρ) is an unbiased estimator of qcpi,i(s, a) [24, Lemma 1].
However, since these quantities are divided by η(µ,pi−i)i (z), the product of player i’s probabilities,
(i) there can be significant variance introduced by sampling, especially in problems involving long
sequences of decisions, and (ii) the ranges of the v˜ci can vary wildly (and unboundedly if the
exploration policy is insufficiently mixed) over iterations and states, which could make approximating
the values in a general way particularly challenging [38]. Deep CFR and Double Neural CFR are
successful large-scale implementations of CFR with function approximation, and they get around this
variance issue by using external sampling or a robust sampling technique, both of which require a
perfect game model and enumeration of the tree. This is unfeasible in very large environments or in
the RL setting where full trajectories are generated from beginning to the end without having access
to a generative model which could be used to generate transitions from any state.
3 Retrospective Policy Improvement
Retrospective policy improvement focuses on learning from past behavior, by storing complete
descriptions of value functions and/or policies, deriving a new policy from them via aggregation,
rather than e.g. greedily optimizing a current policy. Specifically, a retrospective agent finds a new
policy by playing back through past policies, rather than maintaining a buffer of past data. The
general idea is common in learning partially-observable multiagent games, where algorithms are
built upon regret minimization and learning from expert advice [9]. Regret minimization in self-play
can approximate various forms of equilibria [3]. In single-agent settings, they can also approximate
optimal policies in Markov decision processes [1], even when the reward function changes over
time [14, 21], and solve a general class of robust optimization problems [13]. We also show some
appealing properties in the single-agent case via some illustrative examples (Section 3.4).
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3.1 The Advantage Regret-Matching Actor-Critic
ARMAC is a model-free RL algorithm motivated by CFR. Like algorithms in the CFR framework,
ARMAC uses a centralized training setup and operates in epochs that correspond to CFR iterations.
Like RCFR, ARMAC uses function approximation to generate policies. ARMAC was designed so
that as the number of samples per epoch increases and the expressiveness of the function approximator
approaches a lookup table, the generated sequence of policies approaches that of CFR. Instead of
accumulating cumulative regrets– which is problematic for a neural network– the algorithm learns a
conditional advantage estimate W¯ (s, a) by regression toward a history-dependent advantage A(h, a),
for h ∈ s, and uses it to derive the next set of joint policies that CFR would produce. Indeed we
show that W¯ (s, a) is an estimate of the cumulative regret R(s, a) up to a multiplicative factor which
is a function of the information state s only, and thus cancels out during the regret-matching step.
ARMAC is a Monte Carlo algorithm in the same sense as MCCFR: value estimates are trained
from full episodes. It uses off-policy learning for training the value estimates (i.e. critics), which we
show is sufficient to derive W¯ . However, contrary to MCCFR, it does not use importance sampling.
ARMAC is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Advantage Regret-Matching Actor-Critic
input : initial set of parameters θ0, number of players n
i← 1
for epoch t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · } do
reset D ← ∅
Let pit(s) = NORMALIZEDRELU(W¯θt(s)) (i.e. Eq. 1)
Let vθt(h) =
∑
a∈A(h) pi
t(h, a)qθt(h, a)
Let µti be a behavior policy for each player i
for episode k ∈ {1, . . . ,Kact} do
i← (i+ 1) mod n
Sample j ∼ UNIF({0, 1, · · · , t− 1})
Sample trajectory ρ ∼ (µi, pij−i)
let d← (i, j, {ui(ρ)}i∈N )
for history h ∈ ρ where player i acts do
let s be the state containing h
let ~r = {qθj (h, a′)− vθj (h)}a′∈A(s)
let a be the action that was taken in ρ
f append (h, s, a, ~r, pij(s)) to d
end
add d to D
end
for learning step k ∈ {1, . . . ,Klearn} do
Sample a random episode/batch d ∼ UNIF(D):
for history and corresponding state (h, s) ∈ d do
Use Tree-Backup(λ) to train the critic qθt(h, a)
If τ(s) = i: train W¯θt to predict A(h, a)
If τ(s) ∈ −i: train p¯iθt to predict pit(s)
end
end
Save θt for future retrospective replays
θt+1 ← θt
end
ARMAC runs over multiple epochs
t and produces a joint policies pit+1
at the end of each epoch. Each epoch
starts with an empty data set D and
simulates a variety of joint policies ex-
ecuting multiple training iterations of
relevant function approximators. AR-
MAC trains several estimators which
can be either heads on the same neu-
ral network, or separate neural net-
works. The first one estimate the
history-action values qpit,i(h, a) =∑
z∈Z(h,a) η
pit(h, z)ui(z). This es-
timator2 can be trained on all pre-
vious data by using any off-policy
policy evaluation algorithm from ex-
periences stored in replay memory
(we use Tree-Backup(λ) [30]). If
trained until zero error, this quan-
tity would produce the same history
value estimates as recursive CFR com-
putes in its tree pass. Secondly, the
algorithm also trains a state-action
network W¯ ti (s, a) that estimates the
expected advantage Aµt,i(h, a) =
qµt,i(h, a)− vµt,i(h) conditioned on
h ∈ s when following some mixture
policy µt (which will be precisely de-
fined in Section 3.2). It happens that
W¯ ti (s, a) is an estimate of the cumu-
lative regret Rt(s, a) multiplied by
a (non-negative) function which de-
pends on the information state s only,
thus does not impact the policy im-
provement step by regret-matching
2In practice, rather than using h as input to our approximators, we use a concatenation of all players’
observations, i.e. an encoding of the augmented information states or action-observation histories [10, 22]. In
some games this is sufficient to recover a full history. In others there is hidden state from all players, we can
consider any chance event to be delayed until the first observation of its effects by any of the players in the game.
Thus, the critics represent an expectation over those hidden outcomes. Since this does not affect the theoretical
results, we choose this notation for simplicity. Importantly, ARMAC remains model-free: we never enumerate
chance moves explicitly nor evaluate their probabilities which may be complex for many practical applications.
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(see Lemma 1). Once W¯ ti (s, a) is trained, the next joint policy pi
t+1(s, a) can be produced by
normalizing the positive part as in Eq. 1. After each training epoch the joint policy pit is saved into a
past policy reservoir, as it will have to be loaded and played during future epochs. Lastly, an average
policy head p¯it is also trained via a classification loss to predict the policy pit
′
over all time steps
t′ ≤ t. We explain its use in Section 4.
Using a history-based critic allows ARMAC to avoid using importance weight (IW) based off-policy
correction as is the case in MCCFR, but at the cost of higher bias due to inaccuracies that the critic has.
Using IW may be especially problematic for long games. For large games the critic will inevitably
rely on generalization to produce history-value estimates.
To save memory, reservoir sampling with buffer of size of 1024 was used to prune past policies.
3.2 Theoretical Properties
Each epoch t estimates qpit,i(h, a) =
∑
z∈Z(h,a) η
pit(h, z)ui(z) and value vpit,i(h) =∑
a pi
t(h, a)qpit,i(h, a) for the current policies (pit). Let us write the advantages Apit,i(h, a) =
qpit,i(h, a)− vpit,i(h). Notice that we learn functions of the history h and not state s.
At epoch T , in order to deduce the next policy, piT+1, CFR applies regret-matching using the cumu-
lative counterfactual regret RTi (s, a). As already discussed, directly estimating R
T
i using sampling
suffers from high variance due to the inverse probability η(µ,pi−i)i (z) in (2). Instead, ARMAC trains a
network W¯Ti (s, a) that estimates a conditional advantage along trajectories generated in the following
way: For player i we select a behavior policy µTi providing a good state-space coverage, e.g. a mixture
of past policies (piti)t≤T , with some added exploration (Section 3.3 provides more details). For the
other players −i, for every trajectory, we choose one of the previous opponent policies pij−i played at
some epoch j chosen uniformly at random from {1, 2, · · ·T}. Thus at epoch T , several trajectories
ρj are generated by following policy (µTi , pi
j
−i), where j ∼ U({1, 2, · · ·T}).
Then at each step (h, a) along these trajectory ρj , the neural network estimate W¯Ti (s, a) (where
s 3 h) is trained to predict the advantage Apij ,i(h, a) using the empirical `2 loss: Lˆ =
[
W¯Ti (s, a)−
Apij ,i(h, a)
]2
. Thus the corresponding average loss is
L = 1
T
T∑
j=1
Eρj∼(µTi ,pij−i)
[Lˆ] = 1
T
T∑
j=1
∑
s∈Si
∑
h∈s
η(µ
T
i ,pi
j
−i)(h)µTi (s, a)
[
W¯Ti (s, a)−Apij ,i(h, a)
]2
.
Thus if the network has sufficient capacity, it will minimize this average loss, thus our estimate
W¯Ti (s, a) will converge (when the number of trajectories goes to infinity) in each state-action pair
(s, a), such that the reach probability 1T
∑
t η
(µTi ,pi
t
−i)(s)µTi (s, a) > 0, to the conditional expectation
WTi (s, a) =
∑
h∈s
1
T
∑T
j=1 η
(µTi ,pi
j
−i)(h)Apik,i(h, a)
1
T
∑T
j=1 η
(µTi ,pi
t
−i)(s)
=︸︷︷︸
perfect recall
∑
h∈s
1
T
∑T
j=1 η
pij
−i(h)Apik,i(h, a)
1
T
∑T
j=1 η
pit
−i(s)
(3)
Notice that WTi does not depend on the exploratory policy µ
T
i for player i chosen in round
T . After several trajectories ρj our network W¯Ti provides us with a good approximation of
the WTi values and we use it in a regret matching update to define the next policy, pi
T+1
i (s) =
NORMALIZEDRELU(W¯Ti ), i.e. Equation 1. The following lemma (proved in Appendix D) shows
that if W¯Ti (s, a) is sufficiently close to the W
T
i (s, a) values, then this is equivalent to CFR, i.e.,
doing regret-matching using the cumulative counterfactual regret RT .
Lemma 1. The policy defined by NORMALIZEDRELU(WTi ) is the same as the one produced by
CFR when regret matching is employed as the information-state learner:
piT+1i (s, a) =
RT,+i (s, a)∑
bR
T,+
i (s, b)
=
WT,+i (s, a)∑
bW
T,+
i (s, b)
. (4)
The W¯T (s, a) estimate the expected advantages 1T
∑T
j=1Apij (h, a) conditioned on h ∈ s. Thus
ARMAC does not suffer from the variance of estimating the cumulative regret RT (s, a), and in the
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case of infinite capacity, we can prove that, from any (s, a), the estimate W¯T (s, a) is unbiased as
soon as the (s, a) has been sampled at least once (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
3.3 Adaptive Policy Selection
(a) Goofspiel (b) Leduc Poker (c) Liars Dice
Figure 1: An average reward a given policy modulation scores against opponent p¯it as a function of time
(measured in acting steps). The brown curve is a random uniform policy (i). Cyan, orange and blue is (ii) with
 ∈ 0.0, 0.01, 0.05 respectively. Pink, green and yellow is (iii) with  ∈ 0.0, 0.01, 0.05 respectively.
ARMAC dynamically switches between what policy to use based on estimated returns. For every t
there is a pool of candidate policies, all based on the following four policies: (i) random uniform policy.
(ii) several policies defined by applying Eq 1 over the current epoch’s regret only (qθt(h, a)−vθt(h)),
with different levels of random uniform exploration:  ∈ 0.0, 0.01, 0.05 . (iii) several policies defined
by the mean regret, pit as stated in Algorithm 1, also with the same level of exploration. (iv) the
average policy p¯it trained via classification. The purpose of generating experiences using those
policies is to facilitate the problem of exploration and to help produce meaningful data at initial
stages of learning before average regrets are learnt. Each epoch, the candidate policies are ranked
by cumulative return against an opponent playing p¯iθt . The one producing highest rewards is used
half of the times. When sub-optimal policies are run for players −i, they are not used to train mean
regrets for player i, but can be used to train the critic. Typically (but not always), (ii) produces the
best policy initially and allows to bootstrap the learning process with the best data (Fig. 1). In later
stages of learning, (iii) with the lowest level of  starts providing better policies and gets consistently
picked over other policies. The more complex the game is, the longer it takes for (iii) to take over (ii).
Exploratory policy µTi is constructed by taking the most recent neural network with 50% probability
or otherwise sampling one of the past neural networks from replay memory uniformly and modulating
it by the above described method. Such sampling method provides both on-policy trajectories for
learning qT
θj
(h, a) while also making sure that previously visited states get revisited.
3.4 Single-Agent Environments
Despite ARMAC being based on commonly-used multiagent algorithms, it has properties that may
be desirable in the single-agent setting. First, similar to policy gradient algorithms in the common
“short corridor example” [36, Example 13.1], stochastic policies are representable by definition, since
they are normalized positive mean regrets over the actions. This could have a practical effect that
entropy bonuses typically have in policy gradient methods, but rather than simply adding arbitrary
entropy, the relative regret over the set of past policies is taken into account.
Second, a retrospective agent uses a form of directed exploration of different exploration policies [2].
Here, this is achieved by the simulation (µTi , pi
t
−i), which could be desirable whenever there is
(a) (b)
Figure 2: The (a) Multi-headed network architecture, and (b) Exploration example.
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overlapping structure in successive tasks. µTi here is an exploratory policy, which consists of a
mixture of all past policies (plus random uniform) played further modulated with different amounts of
random uniform exploration (more details are given in Section 3.3). Consider a gridworld illustrated
in Fig. 2(b). Green squares illustrate positions where the agent i gets a reward and the game
terminates. Most of RL algorithms would find the reward of +1 first as it is the closest to the origin
S. Once this reward is found, a policy would quickly learn to approach it, and finding reward +2
would be problematic. ARMAC, in the meantime, would keep re-running old policies, some of
which would pre-date finding reward +1, and thus would have a reasonable chance of finding +2 by
random exploration. This behaviour may also be useful if instead of terminating the game, reaching
one of those two rewards would start next levels, both of which would have to be explored.
These properties are not necessarily specific to ARMAC. For example, POLITEX (another retro-
spective policy improvement algorithm [1]) has similar properties by keeping its past approximators
intact. Like POLITEX, we show an initial investigation of ARMAC in Atari in Appendix B. Average
strategy sampling MCCFR [16] also uses exploration policies that are a mixture of previous policies
and uniform random to improve performance over external and outcome sampling variants. However,
this exact sampling method cannot be used directly in ARMAC as it requires a model of the game.
3.5 Network architecture
ARMAC can be used with both feed-forward (FF) and recurrent neural networks (RNN) (Fig. 2(a)).
For small games where information states can be easily represented, FF networks were used. For
larger games, where consuming observations rather than information states is more natural, RNNs
were used. The critic was evaluated by feeding both player observations, but to the respective sides
of the network. Policies only get their own observations to the respective side of the network. Both
sides of the network in Fig. 2(a) share weights. More details can be found in Appendix in Section F.
4 Empirical Evaluation
For partially-observable multiagent environments, we investigate Imperfect Information (II-) Goof-
spiel, Liar’s Dice, and Leduc Poker and betting-abstracted no-limit Texas Hold’em poker (in Sec-
tion 4.1). Goofspiel is a bidding card game where players spend bid cards collect points from a deck
of point cards. Liar’s dice is a 1-die versus 1-die variant of the popular game where players alternate
bidding on the dice values. Leduc poker is a two-round poker game with a 6-card deck, fixed bet
amounts, and a limit on betting. Longer descriptions of each games can be found in [28]. We use
OpenSpiel [23] implementations with default parameters for Liar’s Dice and Leduc poker, and a
5-card deck and descending points order for II-Goofspiel. To show empirical convergence, we use
NashConv, the sum over each player’s incentive to deviate to their best response unilaterally [25],
which can be interpreted as an empirical distance from Nash equilibrium (reaching Nash at 0).
104 105 106 107
Episodes
100
Na
sh
Co
nv
0.49
0.18
Leduc poker 2p
MCRCFR
NFSP
(a) Leduc baselines.
104 105 106 107
Episodes
100
0.58
0.13
Goofspiel 2p
MCRCFR
NFSP
(b) Goofspiel baselines.
104 105 106 107
Episodes
100
3 × 10 1
4 × 10 1
6 × 10 1
0.69
0.28
Liars dice 2p
MCRCFR
NFSP
(c) Liars Dice baselines.
Figure 3: NFSP and MC-RCFR on the Leduc Poker, II-GoofSpiel with 5 cards and Liars Dice
We compare empirical convergence to approximate Nash equilibria using a model-free sampled form
of regression CFR [38] (MC-RCFR). Trajectories are obtained using outcome sampling MCCFR [24],
which uses off-policy importance sampling to obtain unbiased estimates of immediate regrets rˆ, and
average strategy updates sˆ, and individual (learned) state-action baselines [31] to reduce variance. A
regressor then predicts ˆ¯R and a policy is obtained via Eq. 1, and similarly for the average strategy.
Each episode, the learning player i plays with an -on-policy behavior policy (while opponent(s) play
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(a) NashConv on Leduc Poker (b) NashConv on Goofspiel. (c) NashConv on Liars Dice
Figure 4: ARMAC results on Leduc, II-Goofspiel, and Liar’s Dice. The y-axis is NashConv of the average
strategy p¯it. The x-axis is number of epochs. One epoch consists of 100 learning steps. Each learning step
processes 64 trajectories of length 32 sampled from replay memory. The final value reached by the best runs are
0.18 (Leduc), 0.5 (II-Goofspiel), and 0.095 (Liar’s Dice).
on-policy) and adds every datum (s, rˆ, pi( ˆ¯R)) to a data set, D, with a retention rule based on reservoir
sampling so it approximates a uniform sample of all the data ever seen. MC-RCFR is related, but not
equivalent to, a variant of DeepCFR [5] based on outcome sampling (OS-DeepCFR) [35]. Our results
differ significantly from the OS-DeepCFR results reported in [35], and we discuss differences in
assumptions and experimental setup from previous work in Appendix A. As with ARMAC, the input
is raw bits with no expert features. We use networks with roughly the same number of parameters
as the ARMAC experiments: feed-forward with 4 hidden layers of 128 units with concatenated
ReLU [32] activations, and train using the Adam optimizer. We provide details of the sweep over
hyper-parameters in Appendix A.
Next we compare ARMAC to NFSP [19], which combines fictitious play with deep neural network
function approximators. Two data sets, DRL and DSL, store transitions of sampled experience for
reinforcement learning and supervised learning, respectively. DRL is a sliding window used to train a
best response policy to p¯i−i via DQN.DSL uses reservoir sampling to train p¯ii, an average over all past
best response policies. During play, each agent mixes between its best response policy and average
policy. This stabilizes learning and enables the average policies to converge to an approximate Nash
equilibrium. Like ARMAC and MC-RCFR, NFSP does not use any expert features.
Convergence plots for MC-RCFR and NFSP are shown in Figure 3, and for ARMAC in Figure
4. NashConv values of ARMAC are lower (Liar’s Dice) and higher (Goofspiel) than NFSP, but
significantly lower than MC-RCFR in all cases. MC-RCFR results are consistent with the outcome
sampling results in DNCFR [26]. Both DNCFR and Deep CFR compensate for this problem by
instead using external and robust sampling, which require a forward model. As with NFSP, and
RL more generally, introducing bias to reduce variance may be worthwhile when scaling to large
environments. So, next we investigate the performance of ARMAC in a much larger game.
4.1 No-Limit Texas Hold’em
Figure 5: ARMAC results in No-Limit Texas Hold’em trained with FCPA action abstraction evaluated using
LBR-FC metric. The y-axis represents the amount LBR-FC wins agains the ARMAC-trained policy. The x-axis
indicate days of training. The left graph shows the learning curve in a linear scale, while the right one shows the
same curve in a log-log scale.
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We ran ARMAC on the game of no-limit Texas Hold’em poker, using the common { Fold, Call, Pot,
All-in } (FCPA) action/betting abstraction. This game is orders of magnitude larger than benchmark
games used above (≈ 4.42 · 1013 information states). Action abstraction techniques were used by all
of the state-of-the-art Poker AI bots up to 2017. Modern search-based techniques of DeepStack [29]
and Libratus [6] still include action abstraction, albeit in the search tree.
Computing the NashConv requires traversing the whole game and querying the network at each
information state, which becomes computationally infeasible as the game grows. So, to assess the
quality of the resulting policy, we use local best-response (LBR) [27]. LBR is an exploiter agent
that produces a lower-bound on the exploitability: given some policy pi−i it does a shallow search
using the policy at opponent nodes, and a poker-specific heuristic evaluation at the frontier of the
search. LBR found that previous competition-winning abstraction-based Poker bots were far more
exploitable than first expected. In our experiments, LBR was limited to the betting abstractions:
FCPA, and FC. We used three versions of LBR: LBR-FCPA, which uses all 4 actions within the
abstraction, LBR-FC, which uses a more limited action set of { Fold, Call } and LBR-FC12-FCPA34
which has a limited action set of { Fold, Call } for the first two rounds and FCPA for the rest.
We first computed the average return that an ARMAC-trained policy achieves against uniform
random. Over 200000 episodes, the mean value was 516 (chips) ± 25 (95% c.i.). Similarly, we
evaluated the policy against LBR-FCPA; it won 519 ± 81 (95% c.i.) per episode. Hence, LBR-FCPA
was unable to exploit the policy. ARMAC also beat LBR-FC12-FCPA34 by 867 ± 87 (95% c.i.) .
Interestingly, ARMAC learned to beat those two versions of LBR surprisingly quickly. A randomly
initialized ARMAC network lost against LBR-FCPA by -704 ± 191 (95% c.i.) and against LBR-
FC12-FCPA34 by -230 ± 222 (95% c.i.), but was beating both after a mere 1 hour of training by
561 ± 163 (95% c.i.) and 427 ± 140 (95% c.i.) respectively ( 3 million acting steps, 11 thousand
learning steps). 3
However, counter-intuitively, ARMAC was exploited by LBR-FC which uses a more limited action
set. ARMAC scored -46 ± 26 (95% c.i.) per episode after 18 days of training on a single GPU, 1.3
billion acting steps (rounds), 5 million learning steps, 50000 CFR epochs. The trend over training
time is shown in Figure 5. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a bound on exploitability
has been reported for any form of no-limit Texas Hold’em among this class of algorithms.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
ARMAC was demonstrated to work on both single agent and multi-agent benchmarks. It is brings
back ideas from computational game theory to address exploration issues while at the same time
being able to handle learning in non-stationary environments. As future work, we intend to apply
it to more general classes of multiagent games; ARMAC has the appealing property that it already
stores the joint policies and history-based critics, which may be sufficient for convergence one of the
classes of extensive-form correlated equilibria [11, 15, 12].
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Appendices
A Baseline Details and Hyperparameters
For MC-RCFR, we sweep over all combinations of the exploration parameter, using a (learned)
state-action baseline [31], and learning rate (, b, α) ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0} ×
{TRUE, FALSE} × {0.0001, 0.00005, 0.00001}, where each combination is averaged over five seeds.
We found that higher exploration values worked consistently better, which matches the motivation
of the robust sampling technique (corresponding to  = 1) presented in [26] as it leads to reduced
variance since part of the correction term is constant for all histories in an information state. The
baseline helped significantly in the larger game with more variable-length episodes.
For NFSP, we keep a set of hyperparameters fixed, in line with [25] and [19]: anticipatory parameter
η = 0.1, -greedy decay duration 20M steps, reservoir buffer capacity 2M entries, replay buffer
capacity 200k entries, while sweeping over a combination of the following hyperparameters: -greedy
starting value {0.06, 0.24}, RL learning rate 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, SL learning rate {0.01, 0.001, 0.005},
DQN target network update period of {1000, 19200} steps (the later is equivalent to 300 network-
parameter updates). Each combination was averaged over three seeds. Agents were trained with the
ADAM optimizer, using MSE loss for DQN and one gradient update step using mini-batch size 128,
every 64 steps in the game.
Finally, note that there are at least four difference in the results, experimental setup, and assumptions
between MC-RCFR and OS-DeepCFR reported in [35]:
1. [35] uses domain expert input features which do not generalize outside of poker. The
neural network architecture we use is a basic MLP with raw input representations, whereas
[35] uses a far larger network. Our empirical results on benchmark games compare the
convergence properties of knowledge-free algorithms across domains.
2. The amount of training per iteration is an order of magnitude larger in OS-DeepCFR than
our training. In [35], every 346 iterations, the Q-network is trained using 1000 minibatches
of 512 samples (512000 examples), whereas every 346 iterations we train 346 batches of
128 samples, 44288 examples.
3. MC-RCFR uses standard outcome sampling rather than Linear CFR [7].
4. MC-RCFR’s strategy is approximated by predicting the OS’s average strategy increment
rather than sampling from a buffer of previous models.
Our NFSP also does not use any extra enhancements.
B Initial Investigation of ARMAC in the Atari Learning Environment
While performance on Atari is not the main contribution, it should be treated as a health check of the
algorithm. Unlike previously tested multiplayer games, many Atari games have a long term credit
assignment problem. Some of them, like Montezuma’s Revenge, are well-known hard exploration
problems. It is interesting to see that ARMAC was able to consistently score 2500 points on
Montezuma’s Revenge despite not using any auxiliary rewards, demonstrations, or distributional RL
as critic. We hypothesize that regret matching may be advantageous for exploration, as it provides
naturally stochastic policies which stay stochastic until regrets for other actions becomes negative.
We also tested the algorithm on Breakout, as it is a fine control problem. We are not claiming that
out results on Atari are state of art - they should be interpreted as a basic sanity check showing that
ARMAC could in principle work in this domain.
C Training
Training is done by processing a batch of 64 of trajectories of length 32 at a time. In order to
implement a full recall, all unfinished episodes will be continued on the next training iteration by
propagating recurrent network states forward. Each time when one episode finishes at a particular
batch entry, a new one is sampled and started to be unrolled from the beginning.
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(a) Breakout (b) Montezuma Revenge
Figure 6: Performance on Breakout (left) and Montezuma Revenge (right). Results are shown for two seeds.
Adam optimized with β1 = 0.0 and β2 = 0.999 was used for optimization. Hyperparameter selection
was done by trying only two learning rates: 5 · 10−5 and 2 · 10−4. The results reported use 5 · 10−5
in all games, including Atari.
D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, let us notice that
WTi (s, a) =
∑
h∈s
∑T
t=1 η
pit(h)∑T
t=1 η
pit(s)
Apit,i(h, a), (5)
=
∑
h∈s
∑T
t=1 η
pit
−i(h)∑T
t=1 η
pit
−i(s)
Apit,i(h, a) (6)
=
1
wT (s)
T∑
t=1
∑
h∈s
ηpi
t
−i(h)Apit,i(h, a), (7)
where we used the perfect recall assumption in the first derivation, and we definewT (s) =
∑
t η
pit
−i(s).
Notice that wT (s) depends on the state only (and not on h). Now the cumulative regret is:
RTi (s, a) =
K∑
t=1
qcpit,i(s, a)− vcpit,i(s)
=
T∑
t=1
ηpi
t
−i(s)
(
qpit,i(s, a)− vpik,i(s)
)
=
T∑
t=1
ηpi
t
−i(s)
∑
h∈s
ηpi
t
−i(h)
ηpi
t
−i(s)
(
qpit,i(h, a)− vpit,i(h)
)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
h∈s
ηpi
t
−i(h)Apit,i(h, a)
= wT (s)WTi (s, a).
Finally, noticing that regret matching is not impacted by multiplying the cumulative regret by a
positive function of the state, we deduce
RT,+i (s, a)∑
bR
T,+
i (s, b)
=
(
wT (s)WTi (s, a)
)+∑
b
(
wT (s)WTi (s, b)
)+ = WT,+i (s, a)∑
bW
T,+
i (s, b)
.
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E Unbiasedness of Wˆ Ti (s, a)
Lemma 2. Consider the case of a tabular representation and define the estimate WˆTi (s, a) as the
minimizer (over W ) of the empirical loss defined over N trajectories
Lˆ(s,a)(W ) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
[
W −Apijn ,i(h, a)
]2I{(h, a) ∈ ρjn and h ∈ s},
where ρjn is the n-th trajectory generated by the policy (µTi , pi
jn
−i) where jn ∼ U({1, . . . , T}). Define
N(s, a) =
∑N
n=1 I{(h, a) ∈ ρjn and h ∈ s} to be the number of trajectories going through (s, a).
Then WˆTi (s, a) is an unbiased estimate of W
T
i (s, a) conditioned on (s, a) being traversed at least
once:
E
[
WˆTi (s, a)|N(s, a) > 0
]
= WTi (s, a).
Proof. The empirical loss being quadratic, under the event {N(s, a) > 0}, its minimum is well
defined and reached for
WˆTi (s, a) =
1
N(s, a)
N(s,a)∑
n=1
Apijn ,i(hn, a),
where hn ∈ s is the history of the n-th trajectory traversing s. Let us use simplified notations and
write An = Apijn ,i(h, a)I{(h, a) ∈ ρjn and h ∈ s} and bn = I{(h, a) ∈ ρjn and h ∈ s}. Thus
E
[
WˆTi (s, a)I
{ N∑
m=1
bm > 0
}]
= E
[∑N
n=1AnI
{∑N
m=1 bm > 0
}∑N
m=1 bm
]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
E
[
AnI
{∑N
m=1 bm > 0
}∑N
m=1 bm
∣∣∣ N∑
m=1
bm
]]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
E
[
An
∣∣∣ N∑
m=1
bm
] I{∑Nm=1 bm > 0}∑N
m=1 bm
]
.
Now, E
[
An
∣∣∑N
m=1 bm
]
= E
[
An|bn
]
E
[
bn|
∑N
m=1 bm
]
since given bn, An is independent of∑N
m=1 bm. Thus
E
[
WˆTi (s, a)I
{ N∑
m=1
bm > 0
}]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
An|bn
]
E
[
E
[E[bn∣∣∑Nm=1 bm]I{∑Nm=1 bm > 0}∑N
m=1 bm
]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
An|bn
]
E
[
bnI
{∑N
m=1 bm > 0
}∑N
m=1 bm
]
Since
∑N
n=1 E
[
bnI
{∑N
m=1 bm>0
}
∑N
m=1 bm
]
= E
[ ∑N
n=1 bn∑N
m=1 bm
I
{∑N
m=1 bm > 0
}]
= P
(∑N
m=1 bm > 0
)
, by a
symmetry argument we deduce E
[
bnI
{∑N
m=1 bm>0
}
∑N
m=1 bm
]
= 1N P
(∑N
m=1 bm > 0
)
for each n. Thus
E
[
WˆTi (s, a)
∣∣∣N(s, a) > 0] = E[WˆTi (s, a)∣∣∣ N∑
m=1
bm > 0
]
=
E
[
WˆTi (s, a)I
{∑N
m=1 bm > 0
}]
P
(∑N
m=1 bm > 0
)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
E[An|bn] = E[A1|b1]
which is the expectation of the advantage Apij ,i(h, a) conditioned on the trajectory ρj going through
h ∈ s, i.e. WTi (s, a) as defined in (3).
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F Neural Network Architecture
The following recurrent neural network was used for no-limit Texas Hold’em experiments. Two
separate recurrent networks with shared parameters were used, consuming observations of each player
respectively. Each of those networks consisted of a single linear layer mapping input representation
to a vector of size 256. This was followed by a double rectified linear unit, producing a representation
of size 512 then followed by LSTM with 256 hidden units. This produced an information state
representation for each player a0 and a1.
Define architecture B(x), which will be reused several times. It consumes one of the information
state representations produced by the previously mentioned RNN: h1 = Linear(128)(x), h2 =
DoubleReLU(h1), h3 = h1 + Linear(128)(h2), B(a) = DoubleReLU(h3).
The immediate regret head is formed by applying B(s) on the information state representation
followed by a single linear layer of the size of the number of actions in the game. The same is done
for an average regret head and mean policy head. All those B(s) do not share weights between
themselves, but share weights with respective heads for another player.
The global critic q(h) is defined in the following way. nA = Linear(128), nB = Linear(128),
a0 = nA(s0) + nB(s1), a0 = nB(s0) + nA(s1), h1 = Concat(a0, a1), h2 = B(h1) and finally
q0(s1, s2) and q1(s1, s2) are evaluated by a two linear layers on top of h2. B(x) shares architecture
but does not share parameters with the ones used previously.
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